HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS: IMPLICATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN NIGERIA by Ezeji, Nkeiruka Rosario & Ozoigbo, Bonaventure Ikechukwu
  
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies 
ISSN: 2501-8590  
ISSN-L: 2501-8590  
Available on-line at: www.oapub.org/soc 
 
Copyright © The Author(s). All Rights Reserved.                                                                                                                  
© 2015 – 2017 Open Access Publishing Group                                                                                                                         178 
doi: 10.5281/zenodo.839264 Volume 2 │ Issue 6 │ 2017 
 
HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS: 
IMPLICATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN NIGERIA 
 
Ezeji, Nkeiruka Rosarioi, 
Ozoigbo, Bonaventure Ikechukwu 
Directorate of General Studies 
Federal University of Technology, Owerri, Nigeria 
 
Abstract: 
The epicenter of every development discourse is for humanity--placing individuals 
firmly as the major concern for analysis and policy. With its economic and political 
implications which can frustrate development, Horizontal Inequalities (multi-
dimensional inequalities among identity groups rather than individuals) is an 
important dimension of wellbeing and correcting Horizontal Inequalities should form a 
significant aspect of development policy design. People act according to perceived 
injustices and hence perceptions of Horizontal Inequalities affect the likelihood of 
conflict. This paper focuses on the group dimension of inequalities which seems to be 
ignored/ relegated but is a recurrent causative factor of ethnic conflicts in 
heterogeneous societies. It also explores the power and employment distribution 
amongst ethnic groups in Nigeria. The paper recommends mainstreaming the 
perspective of Horizontal inequalities in development cooperation in Nigeria vis-a-visa 
redefinition of ethnic/ regional make up; re-creation of local government areas based on 
population rather than land mass; adequate compensation for resource based areas; 
putting time line to the catchment area policy and achieving a representative 
bureaucracy through effective employment equity policies/programmes. These will 
help to close up the unequal gaps, reduce ethnic grievances and thus, promote stability 
and development.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Inequality began when our species began. Since then its dimensions and its harmful 
consequences have both multiplied. The debate over the status of grievances dates back 
to the 1960s with the introduction of relative deprivation theory. Gurr (1970) and his 
colleagues adopting psychological theories of conflict in his theory of relative 
deprivation characterizes various types of collective violence as reactions to frustrations 
stemming from unfulfilled aspirations usually related to material well-being. That is to 
say, economic and other types of inequality more generally increase the risk of internal 
strife through frustrated expectations. 
 Overlap between ethnicity and religion (Seul, 1999), geographic region 
(Cederman et al, 2007) and socio-economic class (Stewart, 2000) have all been linked to 
higher grievances that can fuel ethnic conflicts. The difficulty of measuring grievances 
directly has led many scholars to investigate how structural features such as societal 
divisions can generate violent conflicts. Although different types of cleavages can be 
theoretically linked to conflict, the most obvious is ethnic distinctions because of their 
ascriptive and highly visible nature as well as their clear importance in many actual 
conflicts (Sambanis, 2001; Bahaug et al, 2014).  
 Horizontal Inequalities matter to people and society for a variety of reasons; 
because group members identify with their group and the well-being of the group 
affects their identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Stewart & Langer 2008); because such 
inequalities affect efficiency since the potential of the deprived group is not realized and 
perhaps most serious because they can lead to political instability (Ostby, 2003; 
Mancini, 2008; Stewart & Langer 2008). Unequal access to political/economic/ social 
resources by different cultural groups can reduce individual welfare of the individuals 
in the losing groups over and above what their individual position would merit, 
because their self-esteem is bound up with the progress of the group. But of greater 
consequence is the argument that where there are such inequalities in resource access 
and outcomes, coinciding with cultural differences, culture can become a powerful 
mobilizing agent that can lead to a range of political disturbances.  
 Stewart (2001) pointed out that the inclusion of such vital information or data on 
both horizontal and vertical dimensions of inequalities would provide a comprehensive 
policy framework for programs targeting poverty and inequality. On the contrary, the 
exclusion of any of the multiple dimensions of poverty and inequality can be an 
impediment that could weaken the effectiveness of anti-poverty strategies and by so 
doing, weaken the capacity of Nigeria to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. 
Studies by Stewart (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2005) on horizontal dimension of 
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inequality suggest that horizontal analysis provide useful information that society or 
country can use to combat most horizontal tensions which build up to perpetuate 
violent conflict.  
 Nigeria is a federation consisting of diverse ethnic groups that can each be 
distinguished by the area they inhabit, their language, culture, religion and even 
resources (Olowu, 1995; Affin, 2007; Adeosun, 2011). Nigeria has between 250 and 400 
ethnic groups. Otite quoted in Mustapha (2007) specifically identified a total of 374 
ethnic groups. The three major groups are the Hausa/Fulani in the North; the Yoruba in 
the South-west; and the Igbo in the South-east. Other groups include the Edo in the 
mid-west; the Kanuri in the North-east; the Tiv and Nupe in the Middle-belt; and the 
Urhobo, Isoko, Ijaw, Itsekiri and Efik in the Niger-Delta region. The South is 
predominantly Christian while the North is mostly Muslim.  
 Nigeria’s heterogeneous environment naturally creates a complex climate for 
intense competition for available resources and opportunities amongst the various 
ethnic groups that constitute the country. Nigeria’s political history is replete with 
issues of marginalization and inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities. 
Marginalization manifests in terms of the perceived failure of the distribution of 
political power and public sector employment, to fairly reflect the country’s linguistic, 
ethnic, religious and geographic diversity. (Bassey, 2005; Akintoye et al 2012). It has 
been observed that, ethnically polarized societies are prone to competitive rent-seeking 
activities by different groups and will have difficulty agreeing on public goods such as 
infrastructure, and good policies, hence, there is a widespread notion that the lopsided 
distribution of resources of the nation accounts for the strong agitation for power 
control at the centre. And we ask, do horizontal inequalities explain ethnic conflicts in 
Nigeria? If yes, what are the implications on development policies in Nigeria?  
 This study seeks to bring to light the knowledge gap the horizontal dimension of 
inequality. This is a major constraint in designing anti-poverty strategies and policies. It 
is expected that outcomes from the study would stimulate the debates and further 
researches on inequality and more empirical evidence which would serve as a policy 
module for the government when designing an intervention for inequality and poverty 
in Nigeria. 
 
2. Horizontal Inequality and Ethnic Conflicts 
 
Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) is defined as inequality among culturally defined (or 
constructed) groups (Stewart & Langer, 2008). Horizontal Inequalities are 
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multidimensional such as political, economic and social, and a range of elements in 
each of these dimensions.  
 Economic HIs include inequalities in access to and ownership of assets – 
financial, human, and natural resource-based. In addition, they comprise 
inequalities in income levels and employment opportunities, which depend on 
such assets and the general conditions of the economy.  
 Great economic inequalities may persist over a long period of time without 
raising violent response. But when these economic inequalities are combined with 
changes in cultural or political status (such as downgrading or exclusion from power) 
these economic factors can be important in the polarization process of the inequalities, 
and thus as a mobilizing agent (Langer & Brown, 2008). 
 Social HIs include inequalities in access to a range of services, such as education, 
healthcare and housing, as well as benefits of educational and healthcare 
outcomes.  
 Political HIs include inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and 
power among groups, including control over the military, the cabinet, local and 
state governments, legislative assemblies, the police and the presidency. They 
also encompass inequalities in people’s capabilities to participate politically and 
to express their needs. Political HIs are connected to the ethnic groups position in 
relation to the executive power / government, and being excluded from 
participating in political life is an important factor of political HIs (Østby, 2008). 
Groups being excluded from power obtain almost around the world; one 
example of a group experiencing exclusion from central power is the Kurds in 
Turkey. 
 Cultural HIs include disparities in the recognition and standing of different 
groups’ customs, norms and practices. The cultural HIs, which are differences 
between groups, are connected to culturally inherited factors, such as official 
language or religion (Stewart, 2008). Inequalities along the cultural dimension 
have a focus on differential treatment from the state (and others) when it comes 
to culture ‚in itself‛. Langer & Brown (2008) define cultural HIs as ‚perceived or 
actual differences in the treatment, public recognition or status of different groups’ 
cultural norms, practices, symbols and customs‛. 
 Each type of Horizontal Inequality is notable in itself, but also have wider 
impacts, affecting other types of inequality. Political power, for example, is both an end 
and a means, as inequalities in political power often lead to social and economic 
inequalities. Similarly, there are causal connections between educational access and 
income: lack of access to education leads to poor economic opportunities, and low 
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income tends to result in poor educational access and achievements in a vicious cycle of 
deprivation (Stewart, 2009). 
 
2.1 Origin of Horizontal Inequalities in Societies 
HIs in some cases are persistent and ‚produced‛ by past colonial heritage, where the 
colonial powers deliberately put one group over others, and thereby  producing lasting 
differences between groups in a country (such as in Rwanda or the Maluas in Malysia) 
(Brown & Langer, 2010). But it is also important to mention that the HIs do not have to 
originate from this type of ‚constructed‛ differences by colonial powers. In some cases, 
the HIs are just a case of more peripheral groups which through modernization have 
more contact with the more powerful groups of the society (Østby, 2011). So HIs can 
therefore be persistent over time, or more changeable (Sorensen, 2013; Brown & Langer, 
2010; Østby; 2008). 
 It is noteworthy to state that ethnicity is not a cause of violent conflict. It is 
caused directly by intergroup differences. Most ethnic groups in most cases, pursue 
their group interests peacefully through established political channels (Lake & 
Rothchild, 1998).   
 Some studies have explained the causes of ethnic conflict on two levels of 
analysis—the systemic level and the domestic level (Posen, 2003). According to him, the 
first systemic prerequisite for ethnic conflict is that two or more ethnic groups must 
reside in close proximity. Conflict arises in mixed ethnic community within a single 
state. Ethnic conflict is based on the struggle between different groups for political 
power and status. This leads to competition between the groups for the control of the 
government. The second systemic prerequisite for ethnic conflict is that national, 
regional and international authorities are weak to ensure the security of individual 
groups (Posen, 2003). These groups then become uncertain of their physical safety and 
survival. Collective fears for the future arise when states lose their ability to arbitrate 
between groups or provide credible guarantees for their protection; therefore, security 
is paramount under such condition.  
 The second level of analysis is the domestic level which has to do with the 
effectiveness of states in addressing concerns of their constituents, the impact of 
nationalism on inter-ethnic relations and the impact of democratization on inter-ethnic 
relations (Gayatri, 2010) 
 The contemporary rational choice literature considers it differently as grievances 
and greed/opportunities (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). Grievances refer to historical 
injustices and inter-group inequalities in economic, social and political parameters 
while Greed emphasizes the role of rents, which are lootable in producing inter-group 
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rivalry for their control (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). In summary, Collier & Hoeffler (2001) 
grouped potential causes of conflict as; (1) the quest for justice and (2) the quest for loot.  
However, Stewart (2000) influenced by the work of Gurr (1970), advanced horizontal 
inequalities as the reason behind grievances felt by excluded groups which can lead to 
violent conflict. Hence, HIs support the grievance approach that originates from the 
theory of relative deprivation. It is based on the notion that when cultural differences 
coincide with economic and political differences among groups, there can be a deep 
resentment that may lead to violent struggles (Stewart & Brown, 2007).The theory of 
horizontal inequality connects both theories of relative deprivation and social identity 
(Østby, 2011).  
 Gurr (1970) explains the emergence of violent group mobilization and violent 
conflict. He posits that grievance-induced discontent is the main determinant factor for 
political mobilization, often leading to violence. He defines relative deprivation as 
actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations (goods and 
conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled) and their value 
capabilities (goods and conditions which they can presently maintain, or believe 
themselves capable of attaining and keeping in the future). The proponents of the 
relative deprivation argue that if people believe their current value capabilities are at 
odds with their reasonable value expectations, there is increased likelihood for 
collective violence, especially if the imbalance in expectations is unlikely to be mitigated 
in the future (Don, 2013; Gurr, 1970).  
 Furthermore, Gurr (1970) states that the relative position is the key determinant 
of conflict. Perception plays a tremendous role here. Individuals may or may not 
actually want certain goods, but, the main factor is that they perceive themselves to be 
deprived.  
 Group inequalities have been a contributory factor to conflicts in many countries 
(Langer, 2005), such as Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Northern Ireland, Syria, South Africa, 
Nigeria etc.  
 
3. Nigeria and Horizontal Inequalities 
 
Nigeria has suffered a number of violent clashes between different ethnic and religious 
groups, notably in the Middle Belt of the country where religious and ethnic divisions 
are. Although political and economic issues usually take centre stage, in many conflicts 
these issues are complemented by perceptions of cultural discrimination (Langer and 
Brown, 2008; Langer, 2009). As Horowitz asserts: cultural questions, ‘such as the 
designation of official languages and official religions, and educational issues, such as 
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languages of instruction, the content of curricula, and the official recognition of degrees 
from various educational streams associated with various ethnic or religious groups,’ 
often play a central role in the emergence of violent conflicts (Horowitz, 2002). 
Similarly, Langer and Brown (2008) argue that an important factor behind group 
mobilization is the extent to which cultural customs are differentially recognized by the 
state. 
 Ugoh & Ukpere (2012) drawing from Mustapha (2007) highlighted the interplay 
between communal identities and respective administrative boundaries that led to a 
number of ethnic, regional and religious cleavages in the Nigerian political life among 
which are; 
(a) Cleavages between the three major ethnic groups on the one hand and the 350 
other ethnic groups on the other hand; 
(b) Between the North and the South in respect of 1950 censuses; 
(c) Between the 36 states grouped into 6 zones with three in the North and three in 
the South.  
 Some of the cleavages overlap such as the South-east zone overlapping with the 
Igbo ethnicity and Christian religion while the North-west zone coincides with the 
Hausa/Fulani ethnicity and the Islamic faith (Ugoh & Ukpere, 2012). 
 The South’s pre-eminence in educational resources and supply of requisite 
manpower is only counter-balanced by the North’s dominance of the political power, 
population and size. The North is afraid of Southern domination in bureaucracy while 
the South is suspicious of Northern domination of federal cabinet and elective posts 
(Mustapha, 2009; Ugoh & Ukpere, 2012; Adeosun, 2011).   
 Often this led to feelings of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race or 
religion among the groups that were inadequately represented, which in turn provoked 
tensions and conflicts, culminating in Nigeria’s civil war (1967–1970). Indeed, as 
Mustapha further notes: ‘High levels of ethno regional confrontation and conflict over 
the skewed distribution of bureaucratic and political offices up to 1966 contributed in 
no small measure to the eventual collapse of the First Republic in 1966 and the Civil 
War in 1967. 
 Since the end of the Nigeria/Biafra War, however, Nigeria has introduced some 
measures to contain the threat to its survival posed by these inequalities and other 
fissiparous tendencies, including the evolution of federalism aimed at providing more 
opportunities for different groups to hold a share of political power; the introduction of 
educational quotas; the adoption of the Federal Character principle and the 
establishment of the Federal Character Commission (FCC) aimed at ensuring that 
different groups have equal access to and representation in the Nigerian public sector; 
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and even the building of Abuja as Nigeria’s capital (Langeret al., 2007). For instance, 
employment into the civil service in Nigeria takes cognizance of the country’s diversity 
despite constitutional and statutory provisions on merit and professionalism in the civil 
service (Balogun, 2000). The idea of Federal Character Principle dates back to the pre-
independence struggle for participation in the administration of colonial Nigeria but 
more so after the country became a federation in 1954. During this period, in an 
informal manner, the concern was with legislative representation and equalization of 
interregional appointments in education and appointments at the federal level 
(Adeosun, 2011). Regional quotas were introduced for military recruitment in the 1950s. 
But the quest for reforms after 1966 meant the entrenchment of affirmative action which 
is ‚planning and action to end the absence of certain kinds of people – those who belong to 
groups that have been subordinated or left out – from certain jobs and schools‛ (Ugoh & 
Ukpere, 2012).  
 Affirmative action, a key premise to the federal character principle is defended 
on three grounds (a) to offset past discrimination; (b) to counteract present unfairness; 
and (c) to achieve future equality (Ugoh & Ukpere, 2012). The first concerns 
compensation of victims for past discrimination. The second concerns providing a level 
playing field to counteract present unfairness while the third relates to promotion of 
diversity.  
 The idea that the pluralism of the Nigerian society should be reflected both in the 
political appointments and in the civil service gained momentum in the 1970s. This has 
a constitutional backing in the 1979 constitution which required the reflection of federal 
character in political appointments and in the civil service. This was further buttressed 
by the 1988 civil service reforms which made Directors-General political appointees. 
Measures were earlier taken to eliminate gaps in educational output between the North 
and South through quota admission in the federal tertiary institutions for students from 
all parts of the country. The Joint Admission and Matriculation Board (JAMB) was 
created in 1977 to admit students into all universities on the basis of stipulated quotas.  
 The application of the Federal character principle heightened a sense of 
separateness arising from an excessive concern over state of origin. The quota system in 
employment is seen by some to negate merit and efficiency by lowering standards. The 
proponents of federal character principle laud it on the basis of the need for stability, 
even development, equity and fairness. This debate mirrors the US debate on equal 
opportunity clamoured for the African-Americans and the affiliation against reverse 
discrimination by the white majority (Dworkin, 1978; Posner, 1983).  
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4. The Nigerian Government’s rules and Guidelines on Representation 
 
In accordance with Federal Character Commission (FCC) Act of 1996, each state of 
federation and the FCT shall be equitably represented in the Public Service and Civil 
Service while the best and most competent persons are recruited from each state and 
the FCT. The distribution is made zonal if there are not enough positions. When you 
have only two positions, they should be shared between the Northern and Southern 
zones. Where indigenes of a state or the FCT cannot take up all the slots, the indigenes 
of any other state in the zone are given preference in taking up the vacancy. Only where 
there is nobody in the zone found to fill the post will resort be made to indigenes from 
another zone.  
 Each state is to produce 2.75% of the total workforce in any federal establishment 
while the Federal Government produces 1%. The Commission adopts a lower limit as 
well as an upper limit for state workforce in an establishment. The range is between 
2.5% and 3.0%. In effect, the  Statistical Division of the FCC, monitors the composition 
of different institutions, grouping them into (a) not represented (NR) 0%; (b) grossly 
under-represented (GUR) under 1.5%; (c) adequately represented (AR) between 2.5% 
and 3%; (d) over-represented (OR) between 3.1% and 3.9%; and (e)  grossly over-
represented (GOR) above 4% (Ugoh & Ukpere, 2012:6778).  
 
4.1 Power and Employment Distributions  
Power sharing at the federal level among the major ethnic groups and regions of the 
country has been a thorny issue since independence. For example, the 1994-5 National 
Constitutional Conference inaugurated by Gen. Sani Abacha on June 27, 1994 stated 
that ‚the issue of equitable power sharing has been very contentious in Nigeria, especially since 
independence…the problem of power sharing had been responsible for much of the tensions, 
emotions, conflicts, stresses and strains…no other single issue received a greater attention than 
the issue of rotational presidency‛. Although the 1960 and 1963 constitutions were silent on 
the mechanism for power sharing, the founding fathers recognized the need for power 
sharing to ensure that no group is marginalized or oppressed.  
 The table below shows the Leaders (Heads of State/Government) of Nigeria since 
independence. Nigeria (at least since the end of the Civil War) has been able to prevent 
ethno-regional inequalities and tensions from escalating into large-scale violence both at 
the national and local levels, though both have experienced some violence (Langer, 
2009). 
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Table 1: Nigeria’s Heads of State/Government since Independence 
President/ 
Head of State 
Geographic 
Zone 
Period in  
Power 
Duration in  
Power 
1.Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa  
(Prime Minister) 
North East 1 Oct., 1960 –  15 Jan., 1966 5 years +  
3.5 months 
2. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 
(Governor-General, then 
President*) 
South East 1 Oct.1, 1960 –  30 Sept., 1963 
1 Oct., 1963 – 14 Jan., 1966 
3 years 
2 years +  
3.5 months 
3. Gen. AguyiIronsi South East 15 Jan., 1966 – 28 July, 1966 6.5 months 
4. Gen. Yakubu Gowon North Central 29 July, 1966 – 28 July, 1975 9 years 
5. Gen. Murtala Mohammed North West 29 July,1975 – 13 Feb., 1976 6.5 months 
6. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo South West 13 Feb 1976 – 1 Oct. 1979 3 years + 6.5 months 
7. AlhajiShehuShagari North West 1 Oct. 1979 – 31 Dec. 1983 4 years + 3 months 
8. Gen. MohammaduBuhari North West 31 Dec 1983 – 27 Aug. 1985 1 year + 8 months 
9. Gen. Ibrahim Babaginda North Central 27 Aug. 1985 – 26 Aug. 1993 8 years 
10. Chief Ernest Shonekan South West 26 Aug. 1993 – 17 Nov. 1993 3 months 
11. Gen. SaniAbacha North West 17 Nov. 1993 – 8 June 1998 4 years + 7 months 
12. Gen. AbdulsalamiAbubakar North Central 9 June 1998 – 29 May 1999  1 year 
13. Olusegun Obasanjo South West 29 May 1999 – 29 May 2007 8 years 
14. Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua North West 29 May 2007 – 6 May 2010 2 years + 11 months 
15. Dr. Goodluck Jonathan South South 7 May 2010 – 29 May 2015 5 years 
16. Gen MohammaduBuhari North West 29 May 2015 – date   
Adopted and adapted from Mustapha (2007).  
 
One important source of cultural discrimination is the differential treatment in relation 
to religious practices and regulations. Suberu’s (2009) analysis of the Sharia crisis in 
Nigeria, following the reintroduction of Islamic or Sharia Law in a number of northern 
states from1999, clearly points to the divisiveness of these issues. The reintroduction of 
Sharia Law resulted in violent confrontations between the majority Muslim and 
minority Christian communities in the northern states of Bauchi, Niger, Gombe, Sokoto, 
Kano, Borno, Jigawa, Plateau and Kaduna. In some cases, the death toll from these 
clashes was considerable; for example, in Kaduna the religious clashes claimed around 
2000 lives in February and May 2000 (Langer et al, 2009).  
 Violent conflict is often carried out by ethnic militias, which are prevalent in 
Nigeria. In the North, there is the Arewa Congress; the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) 
-- OPC is very influential in the Yoruba-dominated areas in the Southwest and The 
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and 
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) operates in the South-East dominated by the Igbos. 
The most recent incidence by the Coalition of Northern Groups, on 6 June 2017, giving 
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all Igbo residents in the 19 states of the North a three - month ultimatum to quit the 
Northern region is a case at hand. 
 
4.2 Implications of HIs on Development Policies  
 
Dealing with perceptions of inequality is particularly complex from a policy perspective 
because different groups may have different views on what a ‚just‛ system would be, 
and on the origin of the observed inequalities.  
 The first step in understanding the status and dynamics of Horizontal 
Inequalities in any country is to classify the relevant identity groups (identifying salient 
groups) for example, ethnic, religious and regional --- the group boundaries that people 
mind about and the boundaries on the basis of which discrimination or favouritism 
occurs. Others include; whether the salient groups are geographically concentrated or 
dispersed; whether groups are specialized on particular economic activities; whether 
the government is politically inclined to tackle inequalities or wishes to preserve them. 
 Each of these questions according to Stewart et al (2007) is relevant for policy 
design. Since the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the mid-
1980s, successive Nigerian Governments have pursued policies that claimed to target 
economic growth without addressing inequality. There seems to be implicitly a 
tolerance for growing inequality (Gboyega et al, 2004). Lack of any serious attempt to 
address the issue of HIs in the country is responsible for the continuous failure of 
development policies. This is observed in the;  
1) The worsening of income distribution within individual households, groups, 
states and regions which have resulted in poverty being experienced  in some 
remote and backward as well as prosperous areas in the country  
2) The unbalanced development among states, local government areas and regions 
which  has led to greater inter regional, and interstate income inequality 
 
4.3 Tackling Horizontal Inequalities  
4.3.1 Political Sphere 
Political exclusion is likely to alienate group leaders, therefore ensuring that each major 
group participates in the political arena and has access to power is a critical 
requirement for sustained peace. Political power is located at many levels hence group 
participation need to be identified at each level and appropriate policies devised. There 
is need for inclusivity. Monopolization of political power by one group or another is 
often responsible for many of the inequalities and for violent reactions. 
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 Achieving political inclusivity has its own challenges. It is not an automatic 
result of democracy. (a) Rotation of political powers is anti-democratic. Meritocracy 
must be enthroned but the issue of statism or regionalism must be redefined. 
Citizenship of a state or region must be flexible and based on residence for at least three 
uninterrupted years. This will naturally abolish ethnicism and clannishness that have 
become instruments of violence since amalgamation in 1914. (b) Correcting the 
imbalance in the number of local government areas; it should be based on human 
population rather than land mass. (c) The Federal Character and uplifting the 
educationally, economically and politically disadvantaged states/regions policy of the 
government is a welcome development but it must not be in perpetuity. A time line of 
between 10-20years is recommended for that. Meritocracy cannot be sacrificed at the 
altar of mediocrity. (d) For the executive arm of government that formulates and 
implements development policies, the best brain only should be considered. In other to 
get at this, the paper suggests the reduction of the number of ministries to at most 13-15. 
The people that will take up these positions will be those who are altruistic in nature, 
those that will see the whole country as their constituency and act accordingly.  
 Hence, the paper suggests the adoption of two-party structure with provision for 
independent candidacy. The two-party structure will automatically break ethnic 
leanings and thus reduce chances of violence based on ethnicity.  
 
4.3.2 Socio-economic Sphere 
(a) In the distribution of the nation’s resources in terms of investments, social 
amenities and the likes, human population should be the guiding principle. This 
implies that there must be a free and fair census ab initio.  
(b) There must also be resource derivation consideration. The areas/ regions that 
produce the natural resources must be adequately compensated. This principle 
will challenge other areas to harness maximally whatever resources that are 
found these regions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Horizontal Inequalities and the consequent ethnic violence and conflicts hinder both 
formulation and implementation of development policies in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
government in trying to tackle this problem established the Federal Character Principle 
which has not been able to adequately solve the inequalities and associated ethnic 
conflicts. Again, the Nigerian government in realizing that for there to be socio-
economic and political growth, education is imperative. Hence, the formulation of 
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‚catchment area‛ policy in admission of students into tertiary institutions. This policy 
has failed to take care of the educational imbalance. Rather what we observe is the 
enthronement of mediocrity.  
 The paper therefore advocates for redefinition of ethnic/ regional make up; re-
creation of local government areas based on population rather than land mass; adequate 
compensation for resource based areas; putting time line to the catchment area policy 
and finally putting in place leaders that are above ethnic/ regional influences, true 
Nigerians in all ramifications.  
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